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· Taking Liberties 
· MONDALE ON MAPP 
. . . 
. Yale Kamisar 
. Mpp v. Ohio was the path·breaking 
Supreme Court decision in 1961 that di-
rected state courts to exclude from crimi-
nal trials any evidence obtained by state 
police through unlawful searches and 
seizures. It was the beginning of the War-
ren Court's "revolution" in criminal pro-
cedure, an effort to bring American law 
enforcement practices into line with con-
stitutional standards. Today, with the 
• Warren Court's approach to criminal jus-
• tice under wide attack from con-
• servatives, the Burger-Court majority is 
• gearing up to reconsider and possibly 
• overrule Mapp's exclusionary evidence 
• rule. The Chief Justice himself has de-
• plored what he says is the "high price" 
• that the Mapp rule "extracts from so-
• ciety-the release of countless guilty 
• criminals." Several other conservatives 
• on the Court have hinted that they areal-
• so ready to allow the states to decide 
• Yale Kamisar teaches at the University of Michigan Law 
School. He is the author of numerous articles on constitu-
• tional-criminal procedure, and co-author of Criminal Jus-
62 • tice In Our Time. 
whether they will admit illegally ob-
tained evidence. 
As lawyers prepare for this return en-
counter in the Supreme Court, there is a 
piece of experience in Minnesota that is 
worth bringing forward, especially since 
it happens to involve our new Vice Presi-
dent, Walter "Fritz" Mondale. 
Before the Mapp case, Minnesota was 
like New York and twenty other states 
that allowed illegally obtained evidence 
in their state criminal proceedings. Some 
months after the Mapp decision, when 
Minneapolis appeared to be in the grip of 
a "burglary wave," the local police 
blamed the "new" restrictions of the 
Mapp rule. "I'd have 20 guys in jail right 
now," the head of the city detective bu-
reau lamented, "if we didn't have to oper-
ate under present search and seizure 
laws." 
Similarly, when the State Bureau of 
Criminal Apprehension conducted a se-
ries of police institutes in 1962 to teach 
law enforcement officers the law of ar-
rest, search, and seizure, there was much 
complaint about Mapp. The instructors 
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seemed more interested in telling the po-
lice how to get around the requirements 
of obtaining arrest or search warrants 
than they were in teaching police how to 
comply with the Fourth Amendment's re-
quirements in their daily operations. 
The police backlash against the Mapp 
ruling strongly disturbed Minnesota's At-
torney General, Fritz Mondale, then a 
new office-holder, and just five years out 
of law school. He decided to make the 
principal address at the next state police 
institute, and to use the occasion for some 
straight talk to law enforcers. 
"The language of the Fourth Amend-
ment," he reminded them, "is identical to 
the [search and seizure clause] of the Min-
nesota State Constitution." No one could 
properly maintain, therefore, that a high-
er constitutional standard had been im-
posed "by the Warren Court than the 
state itself declared necessary to protect 
the individual's right to privacy and to 
regulate how government carried out its 
search and seizure activities." 
Furthermore, Mondale noted, "the 
adoption of the so-called 'exclusionary 
rules' does not affect authorized police 
practices in any way. What was a legal ar-
rest before, still is. What was a reason-
able search before, still is." In short, "the 
Mapp case does not reduce police powers 
one iota. It only reduces potential abuses 
of power." 
Mondale went on to declare that "the 
very fact that these institutes are being 
held is eloquent testimony, it seems to 
me, of the basic wisdom of the Court's de-
cision. We are doing today ... what we 
should have done all along. We are study-
ing ways in which we can bring our po-
lice methods and procedures into har-
mony with the constitutional rights of the 
people we serve." 
Then Mondale dealt directly with the 
way that many law enforcement officials, 
in Minnesota and elsewhere, had reacted 
to the Mapp decision: "For those who seek 
techniques to circumvent the constitu-
tional rights of the people, I say that it is 
not only illegal, but contrary to our oath 
and destructive of a free society to do so. 
As attorney general of this state, I do not 
propose to permit our Constitution to be 
circumvented and I serve notice upon 
anyone so inclined." 
Attorney General Mondale was ab-
solutely right in his presentation of what 
the Mapp case had said. If the Minneapo-
lis police facing a rash of burglaries in 
1962 had reasonable grounds to believe 
that a particular "twenty guys" had done 
those crimes, they could still have ar-
rested them. If, on the other hand, the po-
lice only had vague suspicions and lacked 
reasonable grounds for detaining those 
suspects, it was not the Mapp ruling but 
long-standing commands of both the 
United States and the Minnesota consti-
tutions that precluded them from making 
those arrests. The police had never had 
the legal authority to violate those consti-
tutional rules, only the incentive to do so 
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at will, knowing they would not be repri-
manded, punished, or have their prose-
cutions impaired because of such illegal 
conduct. 
Attorney General Mondale's point that 
police had been violating Fourth Amend-
ment and state constitutional rules all 
along did not sit well with local law 
enforcement officials. At an ACLU con-
ference in 1963, the Minneapolis city 
attorney denied that police had been vio-
lating the law; his explanation was that "the 
courts of our state were telling the police 
all along that the [exclusionary evidence 
rule] didn't apply in Minnesota." This pe-
culiar way of reading what was illegal, as 
opposed to the evidentiary consequences 
of police illegality, was echoed by a St. 
Paul detective in his remarks at the same 
ACLU panel. "No officer lied upon the 
witness stand," Detective Ken Anderson 
explained. "If you were asked how you 
got your evidence, you told the truth. 
You had broken down a door or pried a 
window open .... Oftentimes, we picked 
locks." The police did these things, the 
detective noted, because "The Supreme 
Court of Minnesota sustained this time 
after time. [The] judiciary okayed it; they 
knew what the facts were." 
Now that the Mapp decision is being re-
considered by the Supreme Court and 
the American public is trying to reconsid-
er how to conduct its criminal justice sys-
tem, the key points Fritz Mondale made 
fifteen years ago deserve to be the starting 
place for our thinking. It was not until 
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the ex-
clusionary evidence rule in 1961 that 
most police recognized the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment and its state 
counterparts as binding rules upon their 
conduct. Mapp generated serious dis-
cussions about how to develop lawful ar-
rest, search, and seizure practices into the 
training sessions and police manuals of 
American law enforcement in a way that 
had rarely occurred before. 
Any judicial reversal of the Mapp rule 
threatens to have just the opposite effect. 
Law enforcement officials are likely to 
treat a decision that illegally obtained evi-
dence may be admitted into state crimi-
nal trials as though that were a practical 
suspension of the constitutional rules as 
to lawful arrest, search, and seizure. 
They are likely to feel that once again 
"the judiciary is okaying it." With the 
smell of revelations of FBI "black-bag 
jobs" and intelligence agency abuses still 
in the air, is this how we want the Court 
to contribute to the atmosphere of police 
practices as we enter our third century as 
a nation? e 
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